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Estate of JOSEPHINE H. GRAHAM, Deceased. JEAN E. 
FITZGERALD, Appellant, v. SALVATION ARMY OF 
CALIFORNIA (a Corporation), Respondent. 
[1) Wills-Oonstruction-Extrinsic EndenC8.-Prob. Code, § 106, 
declaring that technical words in a will are to be taken in 
their technical sense wess the context clearly indicates a 
contrary intention or it satisfactorily appears that thc will 
was drawn solely by the testator and that he was unacquainted 
with such technical sense, contemplates the admission of ex-
trinsic evidence, since only by extrinsic evidence can it be de-
termined whether a testator was acquainted with the technical 
sense of the words he used, and proof as to who drew the will 
must depend largely on extrinsic evidence. 
£2] Id. - Oonstruction - Extrinsic BvidenC8.-Extrinsic evidence 
that testatrix was an intelligent woman and knew what prop· 
erty she owned, that she appointed the person named as execu-
trix and trustee her agent in various real estate transactions 
and reposed trust and confidence in her, that two prior wills 
were drafted by attorneys but there was no showing that 
she consulted an attorney with regard to the will admitted to 
(I] See Oal.Jv., Wills, § 205 et seq.; Am.Jv., Wills, § 1040 et 
seq. 
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probate, that this will was apparently typed by a friend of the 
executrix on a typewriter in the executrix' home, that it was 
formally executed in an escrow office customarily patronized 
by the executrix, and that no attorney was present when the 
will was executed, together with the absence of an attorney's 
name on the will and certain language therein, supported an 
inference that the will was not drafted by an attorney. 
[3] Id.-construction-Meaning of Words-"Personal Property." 
It was a fair inference from a provision in the will that the 
person designated as executrix and trustee was to receive 
"Two Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) and any part of the per-
sonal property she may desire" that the testatrix did not re-
gard "the personal property" as including dollars, and such 
inference supported a finding that she used the phrase "per-
sonal property" in its popular sense to mean personal effects, 
furniture, furnishings and other tangible personal property 
in and about her home. 
[4] Id.-construction-Meaning of Words-''Personal Property." 
A provision in a will giving the person named as trustee the 
power to sell any of the assets of the trust estate except the 
residence supported a finding that the "personal property" 
referred to in a provision bequeathing to such trustee any part 
of the personal property she might desire was used in its 
popular sense to mean personal effects, furniture, furnishings 
and other tangible personalty in the testatrix' home, not cash, 
stocks, securities and bank accounts, where, if the term were 
given this technical and more comprehensive meaning, the 
trustee could elect to receive virtually the entire estate to the 
exclusion of a religious corporation named as beneficiary of 
the residue of the estate. 
[6] Id.-construction-Meaning of Words-"Personal Property." 
A provision in a will leaving to a person named as executrix 
and trustee only that "part of the personal property she may 
desire" is more appropriate to a gift of personal effects, furni-
ture and furnishings, many of which a legatee might not want, 
than to a gift of valuable securities, which ordinarily a legatee i. 
would not be expected to reject. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County determining heirship. Philip H. Richards, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
A. V. Falcone and Hugh E. McManus for Appellant. 
, 
Meserve, Mumpe; & Hughes, J. Robert Meserve and Douglas 
M. Shumway for Respondent. 
[3] See cal.Jur., Wills, § 203; Am.Jur., Wills, § 1326 et seq. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Josephine H. Graham died January 6, 
1955, at the age of 91 years, leaving as her only surviving 
relative her brother, Fred L. Graham, who is approximately 
87 years old. Her estate was appraised at $157,925.92 and 
consists of real property valued at $40,000, an oil and gas 
lease valued at $150, home furnishings valued at $125, and 
stocks and bonds valued at $117,650.92. 
The decedent's formally executed will has been admitted 
to probate. After providing for the devise of three lots to a 
friend of the testatrix- the will provides that the residue of 
the estate is to be held in trust for the benefit of the testatrix's 
brother during his life. Jean E. Fitzgerald, appellant herein, 
is named as executrix and trustee. Among the powers granted 
the trustee is the power to sell any part of the trust estate 
except the testatrix's home, which is to be retained as a home 
for the testatrix's brother. The will then provides: 
"Twelth: When my said brother shall have died, then the 
TRUSTEE shall distribute the remaining portion of the TRUST 
as follows: To JEAN E. FINGERALD, the sum of Two Thousand 
Dollars ($2,000.00) and any part of the personal property 
she may desire. The residue of my property and estate to go 
to THE SALVATION ARMY OF CALIFORNIA, a religious and chari-
table corporation." 
The matter in dispute is the meaning of the phrase "per-
sonal property" in the foregoing provision of the will. Appel-
lant contends that it includes all the property except realty. 
Respondent contends that it includes only the home furnish-
ings and not the stocks and bonds. The trial court found this 
part of the will ambiguous and on the basis of the language 
in the will and extrinsic evidence found that" [w]hen testa-
trix used the words 'personal property' •.. she intended 
this phrase to be used in its popular sense to mean personal 
f'ffects, furniture, furnishings and other tangible personal • 
property in and about the premises of her home. Testatrix 
did not mean that the words 'personal property' . . . includ-
ed intangible personal property such as cash, stocks, securities 
and bank accounts." Appellant contends that the will is 
clear and unambiguous, that the court should not have re-
ceived extrinsic evidence, and that "personal property" is a 
technical term and under section 106 of the Probate Corle 
must be taken to m~an "every kind of property that is not 
real." (Civ. Code'; § 663.) The applicable part of se('tioll 
-This gift has lapsed because the devisee predeceased the testatrix. 
) 
) 
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106 provides: ". . . technical words in a will are to be taken 
in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indicates 
a contrary intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that 
the will was drawn solely by the testator, and that he was 
unacquainted with such technical sense." 
The ambiguity in the phrase" personal property' I is appar· 
ent from several cases that discuss the different meanings 
ascribable to it. (See Estate of Marin, 69 Cal.App.2d 147, 
150 [158 P.2d 412] ; Estate of Duraind, 51 Ca1.App.2d 206, 
211-212 [124 P.2d 330] ; Estate of Combs,. 136 Ca1.App. 286, 
291 [28 P.2d 711] ; Estate of Kruger, 55 Cal.App.2d 619, 623 
(131 P.2d 619] ; Estate of La Petra, 14 Ca1.App.2d 599, 602· 
603 [58 P.2d 678] ; Estate of Puett, 1 Ca1.2d 131, 134 [33 
P.2d 825].) [1] Moreover, the very code section upon which 
appellant relies contemplates the admission of extrinsic evi· 
dence, for only by extrinsic evidence can it be determined 
whether a testator was acquainted with the technical sense 
of the words he used, and proof as to who drew the will must 
depend largely upon extrinsic evidence. 
[2] It appears from the extrinsic evidence that the testa-
trix was an intelligent person and that she knew what prop-
erty she owned. She admired the work of the Salvation Army. 
The testatrix appointed appellant her agent in various real 
estate transactions, was friendly with her, and apparently 
reposed trust and confidence in her. Two prior wills were 
drafted for the testatrix by attorneys.· There was no evidence 
that the testatrix consulted an attorney with regard to the 
will admitted to probate. This will was apparently typed by 
a friend of appellant on a typewriter in appellant's home, 
where the friend also resided. t It was formally executed in 
duplicate in an escrow office customarily patronized by ap-
pellant. No attorney was present when the will ,vas executed. 
From this evidence and the fact that no attorney's name ap-
pears anywhere on the will and from certain language con· 
tained in the will, the trial court found that the will ad· . 
mitted to probate was not drafted by an attorney. This in-
ference could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, and 
the trial court's finding is, therefore, conclusive on this point. 
·On appellant'l objection the prior willa were excluded from evi· 
·denee. 
tAfter expert teat,tmony that the will waa typed on her typewriter. 
the friend testified- that she mU8t have typed it, althou,h Ihe had 
no recollection of doing 10. 
) 
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As pointed out by appellant the evidence falls short of 
establishing that the will was drawn solely by the testatrix 
and that she was unacquainted with the technical sense of the 
words she used. The trial court, however, did not find that 
the will was drawn solely by the testatrix and that she was 
unacquainted with the technical sense of the words used. Its 
oral opinion makes clear· that it relied on the part of section 
106 that provides: ". . . technical words in a will are to be 
taken in their technical sense, unless the context clearly indi-
cates a contrary intention. . . ." (Italics added.) 
[3] The trial court's determination is sustained by reason· 
able inferences that can be drawn from the will itself. The 
testatrix provided that appellant was to reeeive "Two Thou· 
sand Dollars ($2,000.00) and any part of the personal prop· 
erty she may desire. " It is a fair inference from this language, 
referring separately to dollars and to the personal property, 
that the testatrix did not regard "the personal property" 
as including dollars, and this inference supports the trial 
court's finding that she used the phrase" personal property" 
in "its popular sense to mean personal effects, furniture, 
furnishings and other tangible personal property in and 
about the premises of her home." (Of. Estate of Kruger, 
supra, 55 Cal.App.2d at 623.) [4] The provision in the will 
giving appellant as trustee the power to sell any of the assets 
of the trust estate except the residence also supports the 
court's finding. Thus, appellant has the power to convert the 
entire estate, except the residence, to personalty. If "the per· 
sonal property" were given the meaning contended for by 
appellant, she could elect to receive virtually the entire estate 
to the exclusion of respondent. We do not believe that it can 
reasonably be inferred that the testatrix used the phrase "per. 
sonal property" in its technical sense so that appellant could 
defeat the gift to the Salvation Army should she elect to do 
80. Had the testatrix intended to give appellant that election 
she would have done so directly rather than have made it 
dependent on the court's concluding that she intended the 
ambiguous phrase "personal property" to be taken in its 
technical sense even though she used it in a context that 
clearly indicates a contrary intention. [5] Moreover, the 
testatrix left to appellant only that "part of the personal 
property she may desire." Such language is more appropriate 
to a gift of personal' effect.'1, furniture and· furnishings, many 
items of which a legatee might not want, than to a gift of 
/ 
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valuable securities, which ordinarily a legatee would Dot be 
expected to reject. (Estate of La Fetra, supra, 14 Cal.App. 
2d at 603.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., 
and McComb. concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
4, 1957. 
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